Yerbol Alshinbayev v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-17-2021 
Yerbol Alshinbayev v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Yerbol Alshinbayev v. Attorney General United States" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 163. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/163 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







a/k/a Yerbol Kaundykovich Akshinbayev, 
 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
        
     ________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 





Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2020 
 
 













AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Yerbol Alshinbayev, a native and citizen of Kazakhstan, came to the United States 
in 2018 on a B-2 visitor visa and he overstayed.  In 2019 he received a notice to appear 
stating that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  He filed an application 
requesting protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and other relief, 
which the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Alshinbayev petitions us for review.  He 
argues he is eligible for CAT relief because he will be tortured by his former boss and 
prison guards in Kazakhstan if he is returned and convicted of the crimes with which he 
was charged there.  As substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s determination that 
he is not likely to be tortured in Kazakhstan, we deny his petition for review.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
Until 2017 Alshinbayev worked as a sales manager and translator at ACCM, a real 
estate development firm that builds apartment complexes in Nur-Sultan (formerly 
Astana), Kazakhstan.  He accompanied his boss, Yuri Smogulov, on international trips to 
meet with investors and financial institutions.  Alshinbayev even invested $300,000 of his 
family’s money in ACCM’s projects.  His brother, Yerman, also worked as a driver for 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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and assistant to Smogulov.  When hundreds of the apartments under construction were 
years overdue, Smogulov was arrested and charged with financial fraud.  Alshinbayev 
testified before the IJ that he had at least ten encounters with clients who beat him, shook 
him, and threatened to burn his car as a result of ACCM’s failure to finish the apartments.  
He also recalled receiving threatening text messages from Smogulov from jail.  During 
this time, the Kazakh Ministry of Internal Affairs subpoenaed him to testify against his 
boss, which he refused to do unless he received witness protections.   
In 2018 Smogulov’s wife hired a hitman to have Alshinbayev’s brother Yerman 
killed in what appeared to be an attempt to blame him for ACCM’s criminal activities 
and stop him from testifying against Smogulov.  The hitman turned out to be an 
undercover police officer, and Smogulov’s wife was arrested for attempted murder and 
sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment.  Around this time, Smogulov testified that 
Alshinbayev and Yerman were responsible for the fraud, transforming Alshinbayev from 
a witness to a suspect.  His brother was subsequently arrested, convicted, and sentenced 
to 6-7 years’ imprisonment.   
In April 2018 Alshinbayev entered the United States on a nonimmigrant B-2 
visitor visa.  The following month, he received a two-page report from the police in 
Kazakhstan, alleging that he committed financial fraud from his position at ACCM.  
Alshinbayev overstayed his visa and the Department of Homeland Security served him 
with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  
In response, he filed an application requesting asylum, withholding of removal and 
protection under the CAT.  He testified to the IJ that he is innocent and, if returned to 
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Kazakhstan, fears arrest, a corrupt investigation, and torture at the hands of the police.  
He also testified that he fears rape and retribution by his former boss if he is sent to 
prison.   
The IJ determined that, although the testimony was credible, the harms 
Alshinbayev suffered in Kazakhstan did not amount to past persecution, he lacked an 
objective well-founded fear of future persecution, and his past harm and future fear were 
not on account of his membership in a protected class.  The IJ thus denied his claims for 
asylum and withholding of removal.  Further, he found that Alshinbayev was ineligible 
for protection under the CAT, as he had not shown that it was more likely than not he 
would be tortured if returned to Kazakhstan or that the government would acquiesce to 
his torture.  The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s opinion.  Alshinbayev filed a timely 
petition for review, objecting to the BIA’s denial of his application for relief under the 
CAT.     
II. Discussion1  
Alshinbayev’s claims on review are factual in nature.  He does not challenge the IJ 
and BIA’s determination that he did not suffer past torture. Thus we will consider only 
whether he established a likelihood of future torture.  Where, as here, the BIA clearly 
states that it defers to or adopts the reasoning of the IJ, we generally review both of their 
decisions.  See Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the IJ’s 
and BIA's conclusions regarding evidence of past persecution and well-founded fears of 
 
1 The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 




persecution under the “deferential substantial-evidence standard,” as they are factual 
findings.  Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under this 
standard, “[t]he BIA's determinations will be upheld if they are supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence in the record considered as a whole.”  Kang v. Att’y 
Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  We will only reverse the 
agency if “the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Id.   
Alshinbayev claims that the BIA’s decision to deny him CAT relief was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  He asserts that the BIA and IJ disregarded his 
testimony that his boss would collude with Kazakh officials to have him tortured in 
prison as well as his fear that he would not be generally safe in a government prison.   
“To qualify for relief under the CAT, an applicant . . . bears the burden of proving 
through objective evidence that ‘it is more likely than not’ that s/he would be ‘tortured’ in 
the country to which the applicant would be removed.”  Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 
151, 161 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
This is a two-step inquiry: first, the agency asks “what is likely to happen to the petitioner 
if removed,” and then it decides whether “what is likely to happen amount[s] to the legal 
definition of torture.”  Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation 
omitted).  The first question is primarily factual, while the second is legal.  Id.  
“Generally, an agency is required to consider all evidence relevant to the possibility of 
future torture, but the IJ and BIA need not discuss every piece of evidence mentioned by 
an asylum applicant.” Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).   
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The IJ cited substantial evidence to support its finding that Alshinbayev had not 
shown it was more likely than not he would be tortured.  It noted the lawful and 
commensurate sanctions imposed on both Smogulov and Alshinbayev’s brother Yerman 
for their fraudulent conduct as evidence that Alshinbayev would be treated fairly if he 
was returned to and tried in Kazakhstan.  Although the IJ did not explicitly acknowledge 
Alshinbayev’s fear that Smogulov would pay others to torture or kill him in prison, 
Alshinbayev did not present any evidence supporting his fears that Smogulov would or 
could undertake those actions.  This is not a case where expert testimony and documents 
in the record supporting the petitioner’s fears were clearly ignored.  See e.g., Quinteros, 
945 F.3d at 787 (“But the Board made no mention of the practice that Quinteros, Dr. 
Boerman, and the Harvard study discussed.”).  Thus we see no error.  
In addition, Alshinbayev’s fears of harsh prison conditions and the possibility of 
rape are unintended consequences of the legal sanctions he is likely to face, and thus “not 
the type of proscribed purpose contemplated by the CAT.”  Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 
180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).  To succeed on these claims, he would have to show 
that “petitioners with certain histories, characteristics, or medical conditions are more 
likely to be targeted.”  Id. at 188 (citation omitted).  The record contains no such 
evidence.  Accordingly, the IJ’s determination—that Alshinbayev was “unable to 
establish that what would happen to him . . . would be anything other than a lawful 
criminal case held against him”—was supported by substantial evidence, and thus not an 
error.  A.R. 92.      
*    *    *    *    * 
7 
 
For these reasons, we deny Alshinbayev’s petition for review. 
 
